



CALL FOR PAPERS

SECURITY PERCEPTION AND SECURITY POLICY

Call for English language, country-specific papers to be published in a study volume. The volume will be edited and published by the Center for Strategic and Defense Studies (National University of Public Service (NUPS), Budapest, Hungary). The volume reviews the security perception and national security policies of 10 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries between 1989 and 2017 from the perspective of the following CEE countries: Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.

The volume will contain 10 country-specific reports, each 40.000 characters long. Seeking best quality and most suitable form, the authors will be local experts of the CEE countries who ideally deal with the security and defense policy of their country, selected through a competitive process. Each author is fully responsible for the content of his/her own chapter.

Interested potential authors need to submit a 500-word-long abstract via E-mail to the editor by December 1, 2017, outlining the key theses that he/she deems important to include in the paper in line with the proposed structure of the papers (see below). The editor will be a Hungarian expert of European security and defense policy, Tamás Csiki (CSDS), keeping contact and coordinating the work of the authors (csiki.tamas@uni-nke.hu). All applicants will be notified via E-mail by December 15, 2017 and selected contributors will also be informed about the due process of contracting.

Authors will receive a symbolic financial compensation: a gross amount of ca. 460-480 EUR (depending on the HUF/EUR exchange ratio), for which all related author's and copyrights are to be transferred to NUPS. The formal requirements of the single papers are listed below (Guidelines for authors). The volume will be published in English in 2019.

Important milestones / deadlines of the 1st & 2nd phase: Country-specific studies

September 1 – December 1, 2017:	Identifying and contacting prospective authors
December 15, 2017:	Contracting authors and coordinating writing
April 1, 2018:	Submission of manuscripts, 1 st review begins
May 15, 2018:	Manuscripts are returned to authors
June 15, 2018:	Submission of finalized papers
July 30, 2018:	2 nd review finished, manuscripts finalized

3rd phase: Comparative studies

Based on the country-specific chapters, comparative studies will be written, complementing the original country studies, i.e. on the converging and diverging elements of threat perceptions of the Visegrád countries. These will be published as part of the study volume.





Conceptual starting point (as exemplified by Hungary):

Hungarian security and defense policy has experienced a fundamental transformation since 1989, the change of regime period, right from its founding values and core aims. After the end of the Cold War, a gradual move on the path of Euro-Atlantic integration has transformed the Hungarian understanding of security in three parallel processes: Hungarian security and threat perception, the scope and characteristics of the international role Hungary desires to play, and the corresponding institutional framework have been transformed. The perception of security in Hungary has gained a comprehensive, multi-dimensional feature quite early, already from the beginning of the 1980s, opening up for economic, societal, political and environmental aspects besides the contemporary predominantly military aspect. This approach further strengthened since the transition period, and non-military aspects have been defined both by Hungarian society and political elites as determining.

Empirical studies have shown that the security and threat perception that stands at the core of the security and defense policy of any country has primarily been non-military, as it has been focusing on internal, existential issues, such as employment, social welfare and public safety. At the same time, the desired and achieved membership in NATO and the European Union granted the country a place in value-based alliances and institutional frameworks with global political, economic and military agendas. Therefore, Hungary pursues a value-based agenda in its foreign and security policy through international institutions. The cornerstones of our security, stability and prosperity are NATO and the European Union whose international agendas mean primary commitments for Hungary – as exemplified in its latest National Security Strategy (2012) and National Military Strategy (2012) – both under review in 2016/2017. The transatlantic link is further reinforced by the strategic partnership of the United States, resulting in a more transatlantic-aligned than Euro-autonomist Hungarian foreign policy in general.

Hungary, as a small country with limited geographic scope of action and less influential means for supporting its foreign and security policy objectives, must underpin the participation in these institutions with clear political commitment and substantial contribution to avoid free-riding and the loss of credibility as an ally.

If we want to understand what governs Hungarian security policy, we need to answer the following questions: are security and threat perceptions, security policy goals and institutional commitments in line, and are the necessary means provided for reaching these goals, fulfilling these commitments?

Research questions:

The security environment of CEE countries has fundamentally transformed since the end of the Cold War. If we examine them one by one, we can observe that the subjective perception and objective content of the threats and challenges that CEE countries face, differ. Lately, these can be accounted for Russia's resurgent great power stance, long-term effects of the economic crisis, direct and indirect challenge of mass migration flows and the increased potential of terrorism. As public opinion polls suggest, CEE societies seem to perceive such threats to a significant extent, even though their exposure to them is different. How do respective countries' societies perceive the changing security environment, what have been long-term patterns and what are current threats and challenges identified?

CEE countries formulate their security policies with the aim of effectively





answering both the long-term and newly emerging threats and challenges, whether of military or non-military nature, internal or external. Do current security policy documents and their security policy practices indeed answer these challenges? What security and defense policy tools are deemed necessary to give adequate answers and are the necessary material and human resources provided for these?

Proposed structure of papers:

- 1. Elements and patterns of security perception since 1989** (or since gaining independence, where appropriate)
 - Has the understanding of security been comprehensive (multidimensional), going beyond military aspects?
 - What have been the determining elements of security and threat perception? How have these been changing (i.e. what new elements have emerged)?
 - How did public opinion and domestic rhetoric on security underpin these patterns? (*please provide data from public opinion polls where possible*)
 - How has the changing pattern of security perception been reflected in official security policy documents? (*please provide concrete references*)

As a general approach, a brief chronological overview of the trends and patterns is desirable, highlighting important milestones, turning points and breaks. (i.e. changing perception of NATO, appearance of emerging security challenges)

2. Level of ambition in international security policy

- What are the respective countries' main objectives in the security realm? (i.e. its position on a continuum between passive indifference and the claim to international leadership)
- How do security and defense policy documents (national security and defense strategy, white book, etc.) define the role respective countries seek to play?
- Do respective countries define a formal level of ambition for its international engagement (i.e. number of troops deployed, amount of development funds to be provided)?
- What kinds of international operations are respective countries willing to participate in (military, police, rule of law, etc.)? Do countries claim a leadership role as framework nation or lead nation for such operations?
- Do respective countries in their security policy documents allow for the unilateral use of armed forces or is the use of the military framed exclusively in a multinational context?
- How many troops has the country deployed to crisis management operations, and based on what grounds?
- What kind of tasks do the deployed forces usually fulfill and how are their missions framed (i.e. with reference to humanitarian needs,





international stability demands or specific national interests)?

- Do respective countries usually deploy armed forces in international operations with or without national caveats? If there are caveats, what are the reasons and what restrictions are defined?

3. *Foreign policy orientation*

- Do security and defense policy documents define a preferred arena for cooperation (i.e. preference for U.N., NATO, EU or other)? Do they define important bilateral relationships and in general place emphasis on bilateral or multilateral cooperation?
- Which are the specific areas of geographic responsibility that respective countries define for themselves?
- How are the roles of multinational security organizations (U.N., NATO, EU or other) defined, also in terms of complementarity or competition? Do respective countries favor a clear division of labor among these organizations?
- Do documents or elite discourses describe specific objectives for the future development of EU and / or NATO?
- Respective countries' position on developing an EU defense core as a stronger European pillar of NATO / autonomous defense capability toolbox for the EU.

4. *Policy field-specific issues* (please provide data, where possible)

- Operational spectrum of the armed forces (high-end – low-end, territorial defense – expeditionary operations);
- Capability development priorities
- Defense spending trends

5. **Conclusions and outlook:** As a consequence of the dynamically changing European security environment and perceptions of security, can we foresee a renewal of strategic documents, white papers, long-term capability development concepts in the near future, indicating shifting priorities in aims and/or means?

Specificities:

Keeping in mind that the 10 CEE countries included in the research do not form a homogenous set, there is certain flexibility of the proposed structure of the paper, considering country-based specificities. Here, in the case of Austria, Serbia and Ukraine, the research question needs to be somewhat different regarding the foreign policy orientation and alignment of these countries. The structure of the papers would be similar to the others, except for Chapter 3, where national specificities of





non-alignment / neutrality / shifting positions need to be reflected upon.

Also, the starting date of the assessment may vary, as in some cases the date of gaining independence (Ukraine, Slovakia) or fundamental structural transformations of the state (Serbia) make this necessary. In this regard the guiding rule shall be the last fundamental transformation that has deeply transformed national security and defense policy – in most cases the end of the Cold War, as a starting point.

Other research themes indicated in the proposed structure shall be examined in every case.

Submission deadline for abstracts: December 1, 2017 (csiki.tamas@uni-nke.hu).

Please indicate your institutional affiliation and position, also providing E-mail and telephone contact together with the abstract.

