



CALL FOR PAPERS

SECURITY POLICY INSTITUTIONS AND DECISION MAKING

Call for English language, country-specific papers to be published in a study volume. The volume will be edited and published by the Center for Strategic and Defense Studies (National University of Public Service (NUPS), Budapest, Hungary). The volume reviews the security policy institutions and their decision making processes in 10 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries: Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.

The volume will contain 10 country-specific reports, each 40.000 characters long. Seeking best quality and most suitable form, the authors will be local experts of the CEE countries who ideally deal with the security and defense policy of their country, selected through a competitive process. Each author is fully responsible for the content of his/her own chapter.

Interested potential authors need to submit a 500-word-long abstract via E-mail to the editor by December 1, 2017, outlining the key theses that he/she deems important to include in the paper in line with the proposed structure of the papers (see below). The editor will be a Hungarian expert of European security and defense policy, Péter Marton (Corvinus University of Budapest), keeping contact and coordinating the work of the authors (pmarton@gmail.com). All applicants will be notified via E-mail by December 15, 2017 and selected contributors will also be informed about the due process of contracting.

Authors will receive a symbolic financial compensation: a gross amount of ca. 460-480 EUR (depending on the HUF/EUR exchange ratio), for which all related author's and copyrights are to be transferred to NUPS. The formal requirements of the single papers are listed below (Guidelines for authors). The volume will be published in English in 2019.

Important milestones / deadlines of the 1st & 2nd phase: Country-specific studies

September 1 – December 1, 2017:	Identifying and contacting prospective authors
December 15, 2017:	Contracting authors and coordinating writing
April 1, 2018:	Submission of manuscripts, 1 st review begins
May 15, 2018:	Manuscripts are returned to authors
June 15, 2018:	Submission of finalized papers
July 30, 2018:	2 nd review finished, manuscripts finalized

3rd phase: Comparative studies

Based on the country-specific chapters, comparative studies will be written, complementing the original country studies, i.e. on the decision-making schemes of the Visegrád countries. These will be published as part of the study volume.





Conceptual starting point (as exemplified by Hungary):

The first few years of the post-1989 transition period were spent on adopting liberal democratic institutions in Hungary, among these, the development of democratic (civilian) control of the armed forces. The Constitution positioned the President of Hungary as the commander in chief of the Hungarian Defense Forces. At the same time the Parliament gained discretionary rights in decision making about the internal use and possible foreign deployment of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF). The 48/1991 Constitutional Court Resolution and the 1993 Homeland Defense Act refined the command and control roles within civilian and military commanders, leaving only representative roles for the President and strengthening government authority. Command structures evolved further by 1996 when the Joint Forces Command of the Hungarian Defense Forces had been created in order to meet NATO requirements, and in 2001 when the Joint Forces Command was integrated into the Ministry of Defense, accomplishing fully transparent civilian command and control in this field. Defense planning and procurement procedures have also been adopted following British and U.S. models with the aim of accomplishing full NATO interoperability.

The formal and informal institutions of security policy making – the government, the parliament and its relevant committees, ministries dealing with these fields of supporting their work under a comprehensive whole of government approach, military intelligence services, background institutions, the HDF itself have undergone continuous transformation since 1989, with some overarching trends – like the serious underfinancing of the HDF – remaining in place, and some looming problems – like inefficient procurement processes – remaining intact, and also witnessing progress in several fields, like the adoption of the all-volunteer force model.

Foreign and security policy decision making in Hungary tends to be closely bound to the Prime Minister, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs enjoying more freedom of action than the Ministry of Defense. The use of armed forces is under transparent parliamentary control – while it is strictly limited to self-help and allied crisis management operations within the framework of international institutions. The MFA underwent a major realignment regarding its scope of activities, designating the development of foreign economic relations as its prioritized task.

The strict authorization rule of foreign deployment also became somewhat looser as a consequence of Hungary's accession to NATO, because the rigid procedure and time-consuming parliamentary debating period resulted in obstacles during international military exercises and mechanisms of confidence and security building. The December 2003 modification of the Constitution and the Homeland Defense Act, any international engagement invoked upon the consensus of NATO member states became possible based on government decision while also informing the Parliament. This decision making procedure has also been extended to crisis management operations within EU framework in February 2006.

Research questions:

The obvious compulsion CEE countries faced after the end of the Cold War or upon newly gaining independence to transform and base their national defense policies on new grounds and modernize their defense sectors resulted in multiple transformative processes in the past two decades in all countries. Some have been similar – like creating civilian oversight of the armed forces –, some different – like the decision making processes in place.





At the core of these reforms was the aim to create defense institutions that are able to provide for the security of CEE countries in terms of deterrence, defense, military as well as civilian crisis management, disaster relief, and as they embarked on the path of closer Euro Atlantic integration, also in terms of multinational cooperation. What were the primary driving forces behind, what overarching processes can be identified, who were the determining stakeholders in these processes?

What results have these transformative processes yielded and thus what is the current situation: what institutions are currently in place under what legal provisions, which are the current stakeholders in formulating national security policies and how are decisions made? Who are the informal participants and what influencing factors can be identified in these processes?

Proposed structure of papers:

1. Transformative processes of the security sector since 1989 (or since gaining independence, where appropriate)

- Brief introduction of the changes in the security environment triggering security sector reform, and the evolution of institutional arrangements (e.g. oversight over security and defense institutions, including the intelligence services and the military, with a view to civilian-military relations as well as democratic (including legislative) control/oversight functions; the downscaling of mass post-socialist armies; changes in command and control structures, etc. – *as appropriate*
- The impact and implications of integration/cooperation with NATO / EU structures (*as applicable*)
- How were these changes reflected in official national security documents? (*please provide concrete references*)
- Trends in defense and security-related expenditures (*please provide data*)

As a general approach, a brief chronological overview of the trends and patterns is desirable, highlighting important milestones, turning points and breaks. (i.e. accession to NATO/EU, adoption of the all-volunteer force, etc.)

2. Institutions of security policy currently in place

- What institutions of security and defense policy are currently in place (*please provide an overview of key institutions and their relation, i.e. their hierarchy and coordination among them, oversight relations, centers of decision-making and executive functions*)
- What are the main priorities of these institutions? Are there salient external partners or key international counterparts for these institutions? Are there observable duplications in the range of tasks they serve? What were notable achievements/results of these institutions over the course of the analyzed period? Were there major fiascos involving these institutions?

3. Decision making in security policy

- Who are the primary stakeholders in security and defense policy decision making?
- What is the role of the government in security policy decision making,





if any (adopting strategies, defense plans, deciding on the deployment of the armed forces abroad and internally)?

- What is the role of the parliament in security policy decision making, if any (adopting strategies, defense plans, deciding on the deployment of the armed forces abroad and internally)?
- What is the role of the president / constitutional court / other institutions of civilian oversight in security policy decision making, if any (adopting strategies, defense plans, deciding on the deployment of the armed forces abroad and internally)?
- Has any controversial / debated deployment of the armed forces taken place in international operations (in U.N., NATO, EU, other ad hoc or unilateral frameworks)? *(please give details and explain the nature of the debate)*
- Are there any actors that can informally influence defense policy decisions (think tanks, academia, lobby groups, defense industry)? Are there informal mechanisms or decision-making traditions that operate instead of (or alongside) formal legal instruments?

4. Policy field-specific issues *(please provide data, where possible)*

- What does the decision-making process for the external deployment of armed forces look like? Who are the key players?
- Are there constitutional provisions, or other legal instruments, regulating the deployment of the armed forces internally or abroad?
- What do legal / institutional regulations look like regarding the deployment of the armed forces in U.N. / NATO / EU framework (if applicable)?
- How do security institutions respond to the threat of terrorism and other non-state threats? What Counter-Terrorism institutional arrangements and infrastructure are in place?

5. Conclusions and outlook: *as appropriate, with a view to the contents of individual papers*

Submission deadline for abstracts: December 1, 2017 (pmarton@gmail.com).

Please indicate your institutional affiliation and position, also providing E-mail and telephone contact together with the abstract.

